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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6058
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0798
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2136
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0145
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1261
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 1041
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0680

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000167

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STATE FOR EUR/SCT - BLACK AND EUR/AGS - SAINT-ANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [UN](#) [UNMIK](#) [PGOV](#) [YI](#) [EU](#) [AU](#)
SUBJECT: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE -- AUSTRIA IN
AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 5652

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott F. Kilner. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (SBU) Charge delivered reftel demarche on January 24 to Austrian MFA Political Director Thomas Mayr-Harting. Embassy had previewed the message to the MFA's EU affairs office on January 19.

¶2. (C) Charge stressed that it was crucial that the EU and U.S. maintain unity in backing UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's approach, especially regarding the timetable for presenting his proposal. Mayr-Harting said Austria fully supported Ahtisaari's plans and timetable. Ahtisaari was, Mayr-Harting said, "the master of the game," and the EU should follow his lead. There were some in the EU who believed Ahtisaari's presentation of his report to the parties should wait, in order to give a chance for Serbia to form a government. (He quickly added, however, that "no one" suggested waiting until April.) However, Mayr-Harting said it was his own view that Serbian government formation would be a long process, and he did not favor a delay. Charge pressed Mayr-Harting for his views on which EU member states were most reluctant to proceed on the Kosovo issue. Mayr-Harting said Hungary, Greece, and Romania were the most reluctant. He opined, in this regard, that the U.S. had the most leverage on Romania. He said Spain was less problematical, and noted that Spain had worked well with the Austrian EU presidency on Montenegro.

¶3. (C) Mayr-Harting added that Ministers at the recent General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) had discussed visits to Belgrade in troika format of both Ministers and political directors. The current thinking was that it would be best for these visits to occur before Ahtisaari presents his proposal in Belgrade and Pristina, although the question of timing has not yet been settled. It was important, they thought, that Serbia have a clear view of its "European perspective" at the same time as Belgrade received Ahtisaari's proposal. Mayr-Harting said the visits would signal that the EU was open to resuming negotiations on Serbia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). He added that, under these circumstances, the requirement for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would remain as a precondition to concluding, but not to resuming, SAA negotiations.

¶4. (C) On Russia, Mayr-Harting said Ahtisaari seemed

reassured that the U.S. was confident the Russians would indeed compromise in the end, and not block a UN Security Council resolution. Mayr-Harting emphasized that the EU could not move forward toward recognition of Kosovo or the maintenance of a presence there without a UNSC resolution. He expressed the view that Russia would seek to link Kosovo not to Serbian issues, or even to frozen conflicts, but to something like Georgian accession to NATO. It would be important to avoid any such linkage by presenting Kosovo to Russia as sui generis. It would also be important for the EU to take a clear and united position after the UN Security Council passed a resolution on the issue, especially because any resolution that avoided a Russian veto was likely to be rather vague.

Kilner